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Introduction 
 
 
New Tasks for EU-NATO Cooperation 
An Inclusive EU Defence Policy Requires Close Collaboration with NATO 
Niklas Helwig 
In recent years, difficult relations with Russia and the instability of the Southern 
Mediterranean have presented the EU and NATO with new challenges. They both put 
a stronger emphasis on countering hybrid threats, territorial defence and counter-
terrorism. In the course of this development, the EU and NATO have deepened their 
cooperation at staff level, while failing to harmonize their basic political and strategic 
objectives. EU Member States do not yet share a common understanding of the role of 
the EU and NATO in European defence. The EU could align the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO), incorporated in the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), more closely with the objectives of NATO. This would be in line with the German 
idea of an inclusive EU defence policy. 
 
Currently 22 states are members of both 
NATO and the EU. Despite overlaps in con-
tent and geography, formal cooperation 
between the two organizations, as outlined 
in the Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, was 
hampered by tensions between Turkey and 
Cyprus. It was only the crisis over Ukraine 
that prompted the NATO leadership to 
work more closely with the EU on an infor-
mal basis. By the end of 2016, the EU and 
NATO agreed on a list of proposals for deep-
ening cooperation, which was expanded 
again in December 2017. 
Widespread scepticism in Washington 
that EU defence cooperation could dis-
criminate non-EU members of NATO, or 
that the EU could distance itself from the 
US, has long since evaporated. Instead, 
under US President Donald Trump, political 
differences weigh heavy on the relation-
ship, as evidenced by his recognition of 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. A funda-
mental debate on EU-NATO cooperation 
has also been avoided due to the different 
strategic orientations of EU Member States. 
While NATO’s collective defence is key for 
Baltic and Central European countries, 
Western Europe is increasingly looking at 
the EU’s goal of achieving “strategic autono-
my” in crisis management. Beyond techni-
cal exchanges between EU and NATO staff, 
there is, therefore, a need to agree on com-
mon goals. 
Limited cooperation framework 
If EU-NATO cooperation were judged solely 
in terms of the number of proposals, one 
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might say it had made considerable pro-
gress. At their meeting in December 2017, 
NATO Foreign Ministers added another 
32 to the previous 42 recommendations for 
cooperation. Divided into seven subject 
areas, cooperation ranges from cyber secu-
rity, to capacity development in third coun-
tries as well as parallel exercises. However, 
the cooperation framework is narrow: 
almost without exception, proposals are 
limited to more intensive communication 
between the staff of both organizations. 
For example, the ministers are encouraging 
EU and NATO staff to cooperate more close-
ly on threat assessment in the European 
neighbourhood and to hold joint work-
shops on hybrid and terrorist threats. The 
two organizations have not created new 
formal cooperation structures, but merely 
recommended their staff develop common 
analyses, concepts and standards. 
Nevertheless, NATO ministers already 
regard the limited degree of cooperation 
as a success, since formal cooperation con-
tinues to stagnate. Based on three flagship 
initiatives, the progress of their coopera-
tion is assessed below. 
Hybrid threats 
Combating hybrid threats is a new task for 
both organizations. A hybrid attack is de-
fined as state or non-state actors pursuing 
a mix of diplomatic, commercial and eco-
nomic strategies to destabilize other coun-
tries or influence their policies. Although 
hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon, 
the ‘West’ has so far been unable to counter-
act such activities by Russia or the ‘Islamic 
State’ (see SWP Comments 22/2015). 
On the initiative of Finland, 12 EU and 
NATO members have joined the new Euro-
pean Centre of Excellence for Countering 
Hybrid Threats. The centre opened in Hel-
siki in autumn 2017 outside of the official 
EU and NATO structures. Its informal nature 
means it is able to circumvent the difficult 
process of involving all EU and NATO mem-
bers. Experts delegated from participating 
states pool the analyses of hybrid threats 
and make them accessible for practical use. 
Their findings will, in turn, benefit EU and 
NATO defence activities. 
Despite the centre’s informal structure, 
the two organizations have been able to 
make progress on countering hybrid threats. 
However, the centre’s remit does not extend 
beyond threat analysis. There is no prospect 
of deepening cooperation towards a joint 
hybrid command that can also develop and 
implement defence measures. For such an 
upgrade, the willingness among Member 
States and their services to share sensitive 
information is lacking. A possible opera-
tional orientation would also make it clear 
that Russia is the main source of concern 
for hybrid attacks. This impression is still 
officially avoided out of consideration for 
militarily non-aligned states. 
Countering terrorism 
In order to refute President Trump’s criti-
cism of NATO, it adopted new measures in 
the fight against terrorism at the summit 
in Brussels in May 2017. In the latest round 
of proposals, EU and NATO representatives 
are to “explore ways” for the two organiza-
tions to share information about terrorist 
threats. 
An exchange of such information would 
be a positive step. States are reluctant to 
share findings from their intelligence ser-
vices within the multilateral framework 
of the NATO alliance, even if they contain 
information about terrorist threats. Instead, 
they prefer bilateral agreements. However, 
it is doubtful whether the new EU-NATO 
cooperation will also include exchanging 
sensitive information. 
Furthermore, the current cooperation 
hides the fact that the fight against terror-
ism is politically a highly controversial 
area. The EU-NATO cooperation has so far 
failed to provide any answers to questions 
about the rule of law or the choice of 
methods employed in anti-terror opera-
tions. Under President Trump, the US is 
already pursuing a hard line in the fight 
against terrorism which might eventually 
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rock the transatlantic relationship. The US 
Administration’s increasingly right-wing 
conservative policy in the Middle East might 
even give a boost to extremist forces 
(see SWP-Aktuell 8/2017). A sustainable 
joint anti-terrorism strategy that imple-
ments not only solely operational counter-
measures, but also combats the causes, is 
not in sight. 
Military mobility 
On the face of it, military mobility in the 
EU is a purely technical issue. In order to 
guarantee a credible deterrent on the EU’s 
eastern border, NATO planners are placing 
demands on military and logistical infra-
structure in the EU that were thought to 
be forgotten. The relocation of troops and 
equipment among EU countries has led to 
logistical, legal and regulatory obstacles in 
recent years. Different regulations and legal 
standards are slowing down military move-
ments across the EU’s internal borders. 
Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, 
bridges, roads and rail networks were not 
built to withstand military loads and are, 
therefore, unsuitable for relocating heavy 
equipment. An action plan announced by 
the European Commission for March 2018 
and a PESCO project led by the Netherlands 
are supposed to help governments overcome 
these obstacles. The EU budget already 
supports the expansion of civilian transport 
networks with a budget of 22.4 billion 
euros up to 2020. 
Efforts to intensify dialogue between EU 
and NATO military planners and to increase 
military mobility are, therefore, also politi-
cal issues. The associated costs and pressure 
to reform might lead to resistance from 
Member States. Surveys among the German 
population already reveal widespread scep-
ticism about the purpose of the military 
reassurance measures on the EU’s eastern 
border. The scepticism might be intensified 
by a debate about expensive construction 
projects. Instead, the EU should highlight 
the infrastructure projects’ synergies with 
civilian benefits. In order to do so, Member 
States would have to expand their so far 
limited EU-NATO cooperation and involve 
regional decision-makers at an early stage. 
NATO and PESCO 
Since the EU’s Permanent Structured Co-
operation (PESCO) was only adopted in 
December 2017, it has not yet been an issue 
at NATO meetings. It is a cooperation frame-
work in which 25 EU Member States launch 
joint projects to develop and operationalize 
military capabilities. 
The EU emphasizes that PESCO does not 
compete with NATO. The aim of the proj-
ects is to develop national military capabil-
ities that can be deployed under either EU, 
NATO or UN flags. The EU and NATO want 
to coordinate their defence planning pro-
cesses in order to achieve this goal. How-
ever, it is debatable whether the desired 
coherence can be achieved solely by adjust-
ing procedures. 
For example, the discussions about 
setting up PESCO have revealed diverging 
strategic objectives among EU Member 
States. Countries such as France and Italy 
want the EU to be able to react independ-
ently to future crises in the southern neigh-
bourhood. In contrast, Poland and the 
Baltic countries are acutely aware of the 
possible threat from the East and support 
NATO’s objective of establishing a credible 
deterrent on the EU’s eastern border. The 
successful implementation of PESCO is 
endangered by these different preferences. 
The 17 PESCO projects, which were 
adopted in mid-December, have a strong 
emphasis on developing capabilities for 
crisis management. Among the more ambi-
tious projects is the contribution from Ger-
many to establish an integrated network 
of logistical hubs, which will simplify the 
planning and implementation of out of 
area operations from 2024. The Franco-
German crisis response initiative (EUFOR 
Crisis Response Operation Core, CROC) will 
have the greatest operational focus. This is 
a closely coordinated catalogue of capabil-
ities designed to shorten the planning time 
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of a military EU operations. 
Apart from the Dutch military mobility 
project and a Lithuanian-led cyber rapid 
response team, the PESCO projects do not 
contribute to NATO’s level of ambition in 
the area of collective defence and deterrence. 
However, a 360-degree orientation of PESCO 
to the security interests of all the 25 partici-
pating countries would increase commit-
ment by the Central European states and, 
therefore, also correspond to the German 
goal of an inclusive EU defence cooperation. 
NATO’s Framework Nations Concept 
(FNC) might provide the link for an inclu-
sive approach. Similar to PESCO, the frame-
work also allows participating states to 
more closely coordinate their armed forces 
development. Germany leads an FNC group 
that aims to develop joint capabilities and 
establish multinational forces (see SWP 
Comments 35/2017). 19 partner countries, 
including non-NATO countries such as 
Finland and Sweden, dock on to the Bun-
deswehr as an ‘anchor army’ and thus 
can preserve otherwise costly capabilities. 
Ideally, capabilities developed within 
PESCO could be integrated into the German 
FNC project and, in turn, be used in EU 
operations. 
Taking account of NATO goals 
Germany has so far supported the incre-
mental implementation of the proposal 
catalogue on EU-NATO cooperation. How-
ever, the common challenges can only be 
effectively met through political conver-
gence between the two organizations. On 
important issues – from the fight against 
terrorism to the strategic orientation of EU 
defence policy – the positions within the 
EU and NATO continue to diverge. 
Germany has both a military and politi-
cal interest in closely linking the EU with 
NATO. It should, therefore, put forward 
proposals that move current staff dialogue 
on technical issues up to a political level. 
Informal foreign ministers’ meetings, such 
as the EU’s Gymnich format, could also take 
place with the participation of all EU and 
NATO ministers. 
Germany can also play a key role in con-
necting PESCO with the FNC. The Federal 
Ministry of Defence chairs the main com-
mittees of the German FNC and, therefore, 
already plays a steering role in European 
NATO capability planning. Consequently, 
Germany cannot avoid acting as an initia-
tor in PESCO and seeking synergies between 
the two cooperation formats. In future, 
Germany could introduce PESCO projects 
that are more closely aligned with NATO’s 
strategic goals. NATO is interested in proj-
ects that improve interconnectivity, digit-
ization and joint training of troops. In this 
way, Berlin could promote EU cohesion and 
more closely involve those EU partners that 
lean more towards NATO. 
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